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The External Validity of Laboratory Experiments: 
Qualitative rather than Quantitative Effects1 




Laboratory experiments are used to address a wide variety of questions within economics, 
including whether behavior is consistent with the predictions and assumptions of theory and how 
various mechanisms and institutions affect the behavior of economic agents (see Roth 1987 for 
an overview). The experimental laboratory has become an integral part of the field of economics 
and a productive dialog now exists between theory, laboratory experiments, and field studies. 
Results from laboratory experiments are being published in the leading economics journals and 
many top departments now have experimental laboratories. 
 
Recently, however, a set of papers by Levitt and List (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) has questioned 
what we can learn from laboratory studies. At the center of their critique is the statement that 
“the critical assumption underlying the interpretation of data from lab experiments is that the 
insights gained can be extrapolated to the world beyond” (Levitt and List 2007a, p. 153) and the 
subsequent argument that there are “many reasons to suspect that these laboratory findings might 
fail to generalize to real markets” (Levitt and List 2008, p. 909), suggesting that the critical 
assumption about extrapolation may not hold. Specifically, the authors highlight five factors that 
differ between the laboratory and economic environments of interest. 2  They recognize that 
external validity also is a concern for field experiments and for naturally occurring data, however 
their statement that “field experiments avoid many of the important obstacles to generalizability 
faced by lab experiments” (Levitt and List 2008, p. 910) has caused many to interpret their 
papers as discrediting laboratory experiments and ranking field experiments as a superior 
methodology.  
 
The papers by Levitt and List have caused quite a stir both inside and outside of the field of 
experimental economics. A common response in defense of laboratory experiments has been to 
counter attack field experiments, arguing that field experiments suffer from the same charges 
levied at laboratory experiments, namely a lack of external validity.3  
 
In his reply to Levitt and List, Camerer (2010) moves beyond the generalizability of field 
experiments and systematically addresses the five factors that Levitt and List (2007a) argue 
reduce the generalizability of laboratory studies. Camerer (2010) notes that the features of the lab 
that differ from the field make less of a difference on behavior than Levitt and List (2007a) 
                                                            
1 The authors thank George Lowenstein, Jack Ochs, Alvin Roth and Tim Salmon for their helpful and thoughtful 
comments, and we thank Guillaume Frechette and Andrew Schotter for inviting us to write this comment.  
2 The five factors they discuss are: the level of scrutiny, the lack of anonymity, the context, the stakes, and the 
population. 
3 In an echo of the attacks on laboratory experiments, critics have argued that certain markets studied in the field  
may differ substantially, and thus provide limited insights about, other markets of interest (not coincidentally, a 
common example has been the sports-card market studied by List in List (2006)). In addition, proponents of 
laboratory studies have argued that field experiments also lack internal validity as limitations on control in the field 
make it more difficult to identify causal relationships. Finally, some have raised concerns about the difficulty of 
replicating field experiments. 
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suggest. He comments that when concerns about one of these factors arise, lab studies can be 
altered to better mirror an external environment of interest.4 Camerer argues that there is no 
evidence that lab experiments specifically designed to mirror a particular environment lack 
external validity. In addition, he compares the strengths and weaknesses of data collected in the 
lab and field, essentially arguing that laboratory experiments are more easily replicated and have 
greater internal validity, whereas field experiments have greater external validity. However, 
Camerer also makes the striking argument that external validity is irrelevant for a large class of 
laboratory studies. While he states that external validity is crucial for studies that aim to inform 
policy, he argues that it is not necessary for studies aiming to understand general principles. 
Referring to the former as the policy view and the latter as the science view, Camerer (2010) 
argues that since experiments conducted under the science view do not aim to forecast behavior 
in a particular external target setting, it is irrelevant whether these laboratory results generalize to 
the field.  
 
The papers by Levitt and List and the reply by Camerer (2010) contribute to what many view as 
an overdue debate on the contribution of laboratory experiments to economics. Unfortunately, 
much of the debate has been aimed at a straw-man version of external validity. While the debate 
has centered on the extent to which the quantitative results are externally valid, we will argue 
that for most laboratory studies it is only relevant to ask whether the qualitative results are 
externally valid. Interestingly, among the authors on both sides of the debate there is 
significantly less (and possibly no) disagreement on the extent to which the qualitative results of 
a laboratory study are externally valid. 
  
In Section 2, we explain why for most laboratory studies it is only relevant whether the 
qualitative results of the study are externally valid. In Section 3, we argue that laboratory studies 
are conducted to identify general principles of behavior and therefore promise to generalize. In 
Section 4, we examine whether laboratory experiments live up to this promise. We discuss the 
extent to which qualitative results persist outside of the lab, and how we should respond when 
they do not. We will avoid the debate on whether the concerns about external validity are more 
or less warranted in laboratory or field environments. We do not see this debate as being 
productive as it presupposes that the methodologies are in competition. We conclude the paper 
by arguing, as many others do, that the lab and field methodologies are highly complementary 
and that both provide important insights to our understanding of economics.5 
 
                                                            
4 Camerer (2010, p..) notes “Except for obtrusive observation in the lab (which is required by most human subjects 
protection practices), most of the features of lab experiments can be relaxed, if necessary, to improve 
generalizability if that is an important goal.” 
5 Roth (2008) notes “Lab and field experiments are complements not only with each other, but also with other kinds 
of empirical and theoretical work.” Falk and Heckman (2009) write “Field data, survey data, and experiments, both 
lab and field, as well as standard econometric methods, can all improve the state of knowledge in the social 
sciences.” In their Palgrave entry on field experiments, Reiley and List (2007) write “the various empirical 
approaches should be thought of as strong complements, and combining insights from each of the methodologies 
will permit economists to develop a deeper understanding of our science.” Levitt and List (2007b, p. 364) point to 
the complementarities in stating “we believe that the sharp dichotomy sometimes drawn between lab experiments 
and data generated in natural settings is a false one.... Each approach has a different set of strengths and weaknesses, 
and thus a combination of the two is likely to provide more insight than either in isolation.” As discussed below, 




2: Quantitative versus qualitative external validity 
 
In the debate about whether laboratory studies are “generalizable” or “externally valid,” these 
terms are often not explicitly defined. Indeed, formal definitions of external validity vary 
substantially. Some definitions of external validity simply require that the qualitative relationship 
between two variables hold across similar environments. For example, Guala (2002, p. 262) 
states: “an experimental result is internally valid, if the experimenter attributes the production of 
an effect B to the factor … A, and A really is the … cause of B in the experimental set-up E … 
[The experimental result] is externally valid … if A causes B not only in E, but also in a set of 
other circumstances of interest F, G, H, etc.” More demanding definitions of external validity 
additionally require that the quantitative relationship between A and B identified in one set-up 
hold in other comparable settings.  
 
Levitt and List (2007a) describe concerns about laboratory experiments meeting the higher 
standard. In their conclusion, they accept that laboratory experiments meet the first definition of 
external validity, and argue that (emphasis added) “lab experiments that focus on qualitative 
insights can provide a crucial first understanding and suggest underlying mechanisms that might 
be at work when certain data patterns are observed” (p. 170-171).6 However they argue that 
laboratory experiments fail to meet the higher standard, questioning whether (emphasis added) 
“the experimental findings are equally descriptive of the world at large” (p. 158). More directly, 
Levitt and List (2007b, p. 351) write “even for those experiments that are affected by our 
concerns, it is likely that the qualitative findings of the lab are generalizable, even when the 
quantitative magnitudes are not.” In responding to Levitt and List, the subsequent debate has 
centered on the extent to which quantitative lab findings are externally valid. 
 
This focus on quantitative external validity is misplaced for many (if not most) experimental 
studies, however, as the emphasis in these studies is to identify the direction rather than the 
magnitude of an effect.  Indeed, the non-parametric statistical methods commonly used to infer 
significance rely solely on qualitative differences. Few experimental economists would argue 
that the magnitude of the difference between two laboratory treatments is indicative of the 
magnitude one would expect to see in the field or even in other laboratory studies in which 
important characteristics of the environment have changed.7 For example, the revenue difference 
between an English auction and a first-price sealed bid auction in the lab is not thought to be 
indicative of the quantitative difference one would find between any other set of English and 
first-price sealed bid auctions. Similarly, despite the clear objective of finding externally valid 
results, the experiments that tested various designs of FCC spectrum auctions were not aiming to 
identify magnitudes that would generalize to the field. Instead, they were run with the 
                                                            
6 Levitt and List also note that “lab experiments can suggest underlying mechanisms that might be at work when 
certain data patterns are observed and provide insights into what can happen in other related settings” (2007b, p. 
363). 
7 While many field experiments are written up to emphasize the magnitude of an estimated effect, it is presumably 
not the intention of the authors that the level of this magnitude is expected to generalize to other environments. For 
example, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) identify a nearly six-fold increase in contributions when they increase seed 
money for a fundraising goal from 10% to 67%. Few would expect this result to generalize to a six-fold increase in 
all other charitable campaigns. Presumably the authors do not report this result in their abstract to suggest that it is 
quantitatively generalizable, but instead report the result: to demonstrate the strength of the effect, to compare it to 
the strength of the other results in their paper, and to suggest that it is of economic significance. 
4 
 
expectation that the general principles of behavior identified in lab auctions also would be 
present in the field (e.g. Ledyard, Porter and Rangel 1997; Plott 1997). 
 
The emphasis on qualitative results is in part explained by the fact that all theoretical and 
empirical models require simplifying assumptions. In constructing these models, we eliminate 
any factors that we think are not central. A consequence of abstracting away from environments 
of interest is that we likely fail to capture the precise magnitude of the effect we expect to see in 
those environments.8   
 
Since most experimental studies focus on directional effects, the debate about external validity 
should center on qualitative rather than quantitative predictions. Falk and Heckman (2009) 
introduce a framework that we can use to conceptualize the difference between the two types of 
external validity. Considering a relationship between an outcome Y and a number of variables as 
defined by Y=f(X1, X2, …XN), which they refer to as an all-causes model since it “captures all 
possible causes of Y”, they note that the causal effect of X1 on Y is the effect of varying X1 
holding fixed X* = (X2, …XN).9 Following on Levitt and List, Falk and Heckman also focus on 
the conditions under which the quantitative findings of the laboratory are externally valid. They 
show that the substantial requirements for quantitative external validity are that f is separable in 
X1 and Y is linear in X1. Notice, however, that the requirements securing external validity of the 
qualitative effects are weaker. For the qualitative results to be externally valid, we simply require 
Y to be monotonic in X1 and for changes in X* to not reverse the relationship of X1 on Y.  
 
In the all-causes model, the concerns about external validity raised by Levitt and List are 
concerns that in the laboratory the magnitude of X1 and the level at which X* is held fixed do not 
correspond to environments outside of the lab. If, in contrast to the current debate, the concern is 
merely whether the qualitative effect generalizes, then the differences between the laboratory and 
the field are only relevant if they are thought to reverse the relationship of X1 on Y.  
 
Take, for example, the winner’s curse. Early experimental demonstrations of the winner’s curse, 
using student subjects, found that increasing the number of bidders increased seller revenue 
while providing public information about the value of the item for auction decreased seller 
revenue (Kagel and Levin 1986). Since bidders with different levels of experience may differ in 
their understanding of the incomplete information problem at the core of the winner’s curse, the 
effect of increasing the number of bidders or the effect of increasing public information may 
differ across subject pools. However, independent of the subject pool, we expect that increasing 
the number of bidders will increase the number of individuals who fail to understand the 
winner’s curse. And we expect that providing public information will mitigate the effect of 
incomplete information on the bids of anyone who had previously failed to recognize the 
winner’s curse. The magnitude of these comparative statics will very likely be different between 
students and oil company executives, but we expect the qualitative results to be the same.10  
                                                            
8 We would only describe quantitative relationships with our models if all the factors we assumed away were 
irrelevant for the magnitude of the examined effect. 
9  Note that in many experimental studies X1 is a binary variable indicating different market mechanisms or 
institutions. 
10 Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) find that professionals also are subject to the winner’s curse. See Frechette (2011) 
for a review of studies comparing the behavior of students and professionals. Out of 13 studies that allow 
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3: Do laboratory studies promise generalizability? 
 
In the debate about the external validity of laboratory experiments there has been disagreement 
about when external validity is important. Levitt and List state that “the critical assumption 
underlying the interpretation of data from lab experiments is that the insights gained can be 
extrapolated to the world beyond.” Schram (2005, abstract) has a more moderate statement 
noting that “External validity is relatively more important for experiments searching for 
empirical regularities than for theory-testing experiments.” Camerer (2010) takes this argument 
one step further and argues that external validity is important for experiments conducted from a 
policy-evaluation perspective, but not for experiments conducted from a scientific perspective.11 
Camerer (2010) states that “if the goal is to understand general principles, whether the ‘lab 
generalizes to the field’ … is both irrelevant and often unknowable and distracting” (p.__). In 
fact, a central point of his paper is that “lab experiments can generalize well when they intend to 
(and promise to), but need not when they don’t intend to (and don’t promise to)” (p.__).12 
 
While there may be disagreement on whether there is a promise for quantitative results of an 
experiment to be externally valid, we do not think there can be much disagreement on the extent 
to which the qualitative results promise external validity. Since laboratory experiments are meant 
to uncover general principles of behavior, it is difficult to see how a concern for external validity 
is not warranted. Camerer argues that “in the scientific perspective the purpose of an experiment 
is not to provide results that necessarily generalize to a particular target setting.” However, even 
without a particular external target in mind, the general rules that govern behavior in the 
experimental environment must nonetheless apply in other environments with similar 
characteristics.13 Surely it is a minority of experimental studies that examine environments that 
have no counterpart outside of the study and for which we would not expect that the “insights 
gained can be extrapolated to the world beyond.” While laboratory studies may not promise 
quantitative external validity they do promise qualitative external validity. The question of 
interest is whether they live up to this promise. 
  
 
4. Do laboratory results inform us about the world outside the lab? 
Over the course of the debate, authors have suggested two conditions under which we can 
extrapolate from the laboratory to other environments of interest. Falk and Heckman (2009) 
summarize the two conditions: “When the exact question being addressed and the population 
being studied are mirrored in an experiment, the information from it can be clear and informative. 
Otherwise, to transport experimental findings to new populations or new environments requires a 
model.” Camerer (2010) also highlights that extrapolation is warranted either when the 
population and environment examined in the laboratory mirrors an environment of interest or 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
comparison of professionals and students in standard laboratory games, he finds only one example where the 
behavior by professionals is closer to what is predicted by economic theory. 
11 Camerer (2010, p.___) states that in the policy evaluation perspective “ideal data are those that are likely to 
produce a very good guess about how a policy will actually work in a target setting.” 
12  The many experimental studies on various FCC auction mechanisms demonstrate that policy makers and 
practitioners are often deeply interested in qualitative (as well as quantitative) effects. 
13 For example, Plott (1982) argues that the markets examined in the lab also are real markets and therefore that the 
general principles of economics demonstrated in the lab should also hold in other markets. 
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when one uses previous studies to account for differences between the lab and field (implying 
one has an underlying model in mind). Camerer (2010) states that “parallelism does not require 
that students in a lab setting designed to resemble foreign exchange behave in the same way as 
professional foreign exchange traders on trading floors. It simply requires that any dependence of 
lab behavior on student-professional status be comparable to the degree of dependence in field 
settings.”14 Levitt and List (2007b, p. 364) also stress the value of a model in extrapolating 
experimental results when they write that “even in cases where lab results are believed to have 
little generalizability, some number [a laboratory estimate] is better than no number, provided 
the proper theoretical model is used to make inference.” 15 
 
While mirroring a particular environment of interest or using a model for inference are both 
appealing, it is important to recognize that these conditions are very stringent. It is difficult to 
envision a laboratory study that fully mirrors the circumstances of the external environment of 
interest and it is unrealistic to think that we can find a model that allows us to predict how 
differences between the lab and the field will interact with any comparative static.  If these 
conditions were needed for external validity, then laboratory results would at best provide very 
limited insight about behavior outside the lab. Fortunately, neither of these conditions is 
necessary for the qualitative results to extrapolate. As noted earlier, the qualitative effects will be 
externally valid if the observed relationship is monotonic and does not change direction when 
changing the level of variables seen in the field relative to those in the lab.  
 
In a laboratory experiment, subjects are presented with incentives that are meant to capture the 
central features of the environment in which the economic decisions are usually made. The 
experimenter has in mind a model that assumes that the laboratory environment does not differ 
from a comparable field environment on a dimension that would change the sign of the 
comparative static.16 Provided the experimental model is correct, the qualitative results should 
generalize. What does that mean in practice? What can we conclude about behavior outside the 
laboratory when we reject, or when we fail to reject, a directional hypothesis in the laboratory?  
 
                                                            
14 Camerer (2010) similarly suggests that threats to external validity arise when features of the “common design” 
(Camerer 2010, p. __) of laboratory studies differ in important ways from the environments of interest outside of the 
lab. Camerer suggests that a number of features of an environment will impact behavior: the incentives, the decision 
context, the rules, the endowments, and the characteristics of the actors.  He argues that external validity will be at 
risk if two environments differ significantly on any of those dimensions or if decisions are very sensitive to small 
changes in those features. 
15 Levitt and List (2007b) argue that a model is required to predict outside of the laboratory. “Our approach to assess 
the properties of the situation is to explore, both theoretically and empirically, how individual behavior changes 
across judiciously chosen levels of these factors, as moderated by both the task and the agent type. Until this bridge 
is built between the lab and the field, any argument concerning behavioral consistency might be considered 
premature” (p. 363). They also note that the demands on this model are rather substantial, “unless considerable 
changes are made in the manner in which we conduct lab experiments, our model highlights that the relevant factors 
will rarely converge across the lab and many field settings….what is necessary are a model and a set of empirical 
estimates to inform us of when and where we should expect lab behavior to be similar to a particular field 
environment and, alternatively, when we should expect large differences” (p. 364). 
16 If a laboratory experiment were expected to generate a result that was specific to the lab (i.e. rather than a result 
that identified a general principle) such that the sign of the result might change outside the lab, we contend that the 
experimenter should not have bothered to run the experiment in the first place. 
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Suppose that laboratory results reject the hypothesis that a variable affects behavior in a certain 
way. To what extent does this finding allow us to draw inference on the role the manipulated 
variable will have outside of the laboratory?  If in the very controlled laboratory setting we reject 
our hypothesis, then it is unlikely that the manipulated variable will affect behavior in a more 
complicated external environment.17  
 
What if instead we fail to reject a hypothesis in the lab?  Does that imply that the hypothesis is 
likely to find support in field settings with similar characteristics? Schram (2005, p. 232) argues 
that “After a theoretical design, a test [of a new airplane] in a wind tunnel is the stage of 
laboratory experimentation. If it does not ‘crash’ in this experiment, the plane is not immediately 
used for the transport of passengers, however. One will typically conduct further tests in the 
wind tunnel under extreme circumstances. In addition, further testing including ‘real’ flights 
without passengers will be conducted.” Thus finding lab evidence consistent with a theory will 
typically lead to repeated investigations of the result, and ideally these will be done under 
various stress-test conditions in the lab and in the field.  Absent these stress tests, however, is it 
reasonable to expect the documented comparative static in the lab to also hold in the field? The 
answer may depend on the strength of our prior, but identifying a comparative static in the lab 
certainly increases our posterior belief that the comparative static will be found in the field. Since 
the lab is thought to investigate general principles of behavior, we expect these principles to hold 
both inside and outside of the laboratory.  
 
As with any finding, however, caution is needed to generate predictions in different settings. For 
example, in documenting statistical discrimination against women in the sports-card market, List 
(2004) does not claim that women always will be charged a price that is a specific magnitude 
greater than that for men, or that women always will be charged a higher price, or that there 
always will be statistical discrimination, but rather that when there are grounds for statistical 
discrimination against a particular group the market is likely to respond in a predictable way. In 
fact, in a study on taxi fare negotiations in Lima, Peru, Castillo et al. (2009) document that 
statistical discrimination leads to inferior outcomes for men since they have a greater willingness 
to pay for taxi rides than do women.  
 
So what should be done if we identify a comparative static in the lab but fail to find evidence of 
the comparative static outside of the lab?18 When designing an experiment, the experimenter 
assumes the lab setting captures the important characteristics of environments of interest and that 
the qualitative result will hold outside the lab. Failure to replicate a lab finding in the field may 
result from the experimenter’s model failing to capture central features of the decision 
environment outside the lab. This is akin to when a result that holds true in a model is not 
observed in the world. In these cases, we infer that the model has an assumption that does not 
hold or that the model has abstracted away from something important. Consequently, failure to 
replicate an experimental finding should cause us to revisit the question at hand, as it may be an 
                                                            
17 For example, Schram (2005, p. 231) writes: “The bottom line is that there is no reason to believe that a general 
theory that is rejected in the laboratory would work well in the world outside of the laboratory.” Of course this does 
not mean that the theory being tested is wrong, it just means is that it is not a good approximation of actual behavior. 
18 Of course, some studies are conducted in the laboratory since they cannot be conducted in the field. For example, 




indication that the laboratory and field environments were different on a dimension that plays an 
important role in driving the comparative static results.  
 
For example, theoretical studies by Goeree et al. (2005) and Engers and McManus (2007) along 
with lab studies by Orzen (2008) and Schram and Onderstal (2009) all demonstrated that all-pay 
charity auctions generated higher revenue than other fundraising mechanisms, while subsequent 
field studies contradicted this comparative static. Carpenter et al. (2006) and Onderstal et al. 
(2010) both found that contributions fell under the all-pay auction. Interestingly, the field studies 
also demonstrated why this discrepancy may have occurred. While the theory and laboratory 
experiments had assumed full participation, the field studies found that potential donors will opt 
out of participating in the all-pay auction. Thus the inconsistencies between the lab and field 
resulted from an incorrect (and restrictive) assumption of full participation in the auction.19 By 
ignoring the importance of participation, the initial laboratory model was misspecified.  
 
When results of a laboratory study are not observed in certain field settings, it is of interest to 
determine which assumption in the laboratory has failed to hold true. The fact that certain 
laboratory environments may fail to capture the central features of the decision environment 
outside the lab is raised in Kessler (2010), which highlights a distinction between methodological 
differences and strategic and informational differences. Methodological differences are 
differences between environments inside and outside the lab that result from laboratory 
methodology. Factors highlighted by Levitt and List (2007a) like scrutiny and the voluntary 
participation of the actors are methodological differences, since they systematically differ inside 
and outside the lab. Strategic and informational differences are differences in information, 
incentives, actions, etc. that might vary from one environment to another and can be manipulated 
by an experimenter.  
 
While it is tempting to conclude that inconsistencies between lab and field studies result from 
methodological differences, care should be given to determine whether instead strategic and 
informational differences are driving the results. Kessler (2010) aims to explain why gift 
exchange is more commonly seen in laboratory than field experiments. Using laboratory 
experiments, he shows that differences in the relative wealth of the firm, the efficiency of worker 
effort, and the action space available to the worker (strategic and informational differences, not 
methodological ones) contribute significantly to the differences in results between the laboratory 
and the field. Another example is the lab and field differences of Dutch and sealed bid auctions. 
While laboratory studies by Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982, 1983) find that the revenue in 
sealed bid auctions dominates that in Dutch auctions, a field study by Lucking-Reiley (1999) 
finds the reverse revenue ranking. While these results initially were ascribed to methodological 
differences between lab and field, a subsequent study by Katok and Kwasnica (2008) shows that 
strategic and informational differences can explain the divergent results. Specifically, they note 
that the clock speed in Lucking-Reiley was much slower than that in Cox et al., and they show in 
a laboratory study that revenue in the Dutch auction is significantly lower than in the sealed bid 
                                                            
19 See also Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2008) for a further illustration that endogenous entry may influence the 
revenue rankings in auctions. Interestingly, Corazzini et al. (2010) show a similar decrease in participation in the lab 
when participants in the all-pay public good auction are given heterogenous endowments. 
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auction at fast clock speeds, whereas the reverse holds at slow clock speeds.20 As the initial study 
failed to account for the effect of clock speed on the revenue ranking, the model was 
misspecified and the results seen at fast clock speeds did not generalize to environments with 
slow clock speeds.  
 
Notice that in these examples the failure to generalize was not a failure of laboratory 
methodology but rather evidence that the initial laboratory experiment did not capture an 
important feature of the decision environment. By identifying which features of the decision 





Economic research aims to inform us of how markets work and how economic agents interact. 
Principles of economic behavior are expected to apply outside of the unique environment in 
which they are identified. The expectation and promise of economic research is that the 
uncovered principles of behavior are general and therefore externally valid. However that 
promise does not imply that the magnitude of an estimated effect applies generally. In many 
cases, including many experimental economics studies, the expectation is simply that the 
qualitative results are generalizable. The simplifying assumptions used to secure internal validity 
imply that the magnitude of the observed effect will likely differ from the magnitudes in other 
environments. Interestingly, there appears to be broad agreement that the qualitative results seen 
in the laboratory are externally valid. To our knowledge, there is no evidence suggesting that the 
lab-field differences discussed in the ongoing debate reverse directional effects identified in the 
lab. 
In emphasizing the importance of qualitative results, we have ignored the studies that appear to 
estimate preference parameters in the laboratory. The objective of some of these studies is to 
derive comparative statics, whereas others emphasize the parameter estimates themselves – and 
while some of these parameter estimates may be thought to be scale free and generalizable, 
others are context dependent and therefore unlikely to generalize.   
 
When authors use preference parameters to generate comparative statics, they often do so with 
the expectation that the comparative statics, rather than the estimated preference parameters, will 
generalize. For example, while Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) estimate male and female 
demand functions for giving in the laboratory, they solely emphasize the surprising comparative 
static result that women are less sensitive than men to the price of giving, and it is this 
                                                            
20 Katok and Kwasnica (2008, p. 346) note: “The Cox et al. (1982) study used clocks that descended between 0.75% 
and 2% of their maximum value every second; the Lucking-Reiley (1999) field study used a clock that decreased 
approximately 5% per day… Since slower auctions impose higher monitoring and opportunity costs on bidders and 
are generally less exciting, the slow clock may cause the bidders to end the auction early.” 
21 In fact, if factors like scrutiny, decision context, or characteristics of the actors interact importantly with a 
comparative static in a way that we do not expect, the fact that we did not expect the interaction means our model is 
misspecified. In particular, it means we have left out an important interaction that will be important to include in the 
model to make predictions. For example, if only women (or only students) were to respond to the incentive of 
lowered prices, then a model of demand that does not account for gender (or student status) would fail to explain or 
predict the effect of prices on behavior. 
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comparative static that they subsequently try to extrapolate. They first note that Andreoni, Brown 
and Rischall (2003) find the same gender difference in price sensitivity when examining how 
annual giving responds to an individual’s marginal tax rate. Then, using data on tipping by 
Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Lynn (2003), they find that tipping by men is more sensitive to the 
cost of tipping than it is for women. Thus, despite generating demand estimates for giving, 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) do not examine whether the quantitative results generalize, 
instead they use the qualitative results to predict behavior outside the laboratory. This emphasis 
on comparative statics is also seen in some studies on individual risk preferences, time 
preferences, and preferences over payoffs to others, which aim to identify general principles such 
as loss aversion, probability weighting, present bias, and inequality aversion.  
 
While we may expect the comparative statics derived from preference parameter estimates to 
generalize, it is questionable whether the estimates themselves will generalize. Camerer (2010) 
compares estimates of loss aversion and immediacy preference and demonstrates that the lab-lab 
and field-field differences are approximately as big as lab-field differences. He concludes that 
some preference parameters are scale-free and that their estimates are likely to be externally 
valid. That being said, the external validity of context-dependent preference parameter estimates 
is more questionable. For example, while lab and field studies on other-regarding preferences 
help identify the general characteristics of behavior that result from such preferences, they are 
unlikely to identify the magnitude of such effects across domains. Considering the amount of 
work professional fundraisers put into soliciting funds, it is clear that other-regarding behavior 
depends greatly on context. One act of charity by an individual cannot predict all his other 
charitable acts; instead, each charitable act has specific characteristics. Hoping an estimated 
preference for giving can be extrapolated to all other environments is similar to hoping that we 
can predict a consumer’s demand for all goods from an estimate on demand for one good.  
 
Perhaps because other-regarding preferences are so complex, however, it would be particularly 
costly to dismiss a research methodology from shedding light on the phenomenon. Indeed, 
research from both lab and field experiments have played a significant role in improving our 
understanding of what triggers giving. As noted earlier, field experiments helped us understand 
behavior in all-pay charity auctions. Lab experiments have also played an important role in 
helping us understand charitable giving by providing a controlled environment that enables us to 
identify which mechanisms may be driving behavior.  
 
For example, field studies have repeatedly shown that contributions in many settings can be 
impacted by information about the contributions made by previous donors, see for example, List 
and Lucking-Reiley (2002), Croson and Shang (2008), Frey and Meier (2004) and Soetevent 
(2005). While these studies demonstrate that individuals respond to the contributions of others, 
they provide little information on which mechanisms may be driving the result. One hypothesis 
is that information about the contributions of others may provide guidance when there is 
uncertainty about the quality of the product provided by the organization (e.g. Vesterlund 2003; 
Andreoni 2006). While one easily can show theoretically that sequential giving can generate an 
increase in donation, signaling is a difficult behavioral task and it may be questioned whether 
donors will be able to exploit their ability to signal quality.  Unfortunately, the signaling model is 
not easily tested in the field, as it is hard to isolate changes in charity quality. However it is not 
difficult to conduct such a study in the laboratory, and indeed a substantial attraction of the lab is 
11 
 
that one can easily contrast competing hypotheses.22 Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2005, 2007) 
investigate sequential giving both with and without uncertainty about the quality of the public 
good. They find that sequential contributions increase giving when there is uncertainty about the 
quality of a public good, but not when the quality of the public good is known. Thus, behavior is 
consistent with individuals seeing large initial contributions as a signal of the charity’s quality. 
This result corresponds with field evidence that new donors are more sensitive to information on 
past contributions than are continuing donors. 
 
Lab and field experiments each add unique and complementary insights to our understanding of 
economic behavior. Discussions aiming to secure a relative ranking of the two methodologies are 
both unwarranted and unproductive. Instead, methodological discussions should highlight the 
ways in which laboratory and field experiments are complements. And ideally, those discussions 
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